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asset described in sections 1221(i) through (5)" of the
Internal Revenue Code.23  This is the so-called "jet fuel"
problem, which was not addressed in the proposed and
temporary regulations, and which also affects the hedging of
supplies acquired for use in a farm or ranch business.
In a transitional rule, the regulations acknowledge that a
taxpayer may treat as hedging transactions all hedges of
purchases of noninventory supplies for taxable years that
ended prior to July 18, 1994, and were still open for
assessment as of September 1, 1994, if, among other
requirements, the taxpayer did not sell in any of those years
more than 15 percent of the greater of the supply at the
beginning of the year or the amount acquired during the
year.24
FOOTNOTES
1 Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. No.
36 (1993).  See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law §
27.03[8][d] (1994); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
4.02[6] (1994).  See also Harl, "Income Tax Treatment of
Hedges," 4 Agric. L. Dig. 165 (1993).
2 T.D. 8493, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2; Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1221-2T; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4.
3 Id.
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2; Treas. Reg. § 1.1233-2; Treas.
Reg. § 1.1256(e)-1.
5 59 Fed. Reg. 36361, July 18, 1994.
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(1).
7 E.g., Stewart Silk Corp. v. Comm’r, 9 T.C. 174 (1947).
8 59 Fed. Reg. 36361-36362, July 18, 1994.
9 T.C. Memo. 1981-43, aff'd in unpub. op. (8th Cir. 1982).
10 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
11 59 Fed. Reg. 36362, July 18, 1994.
12 100 T.C. No. 36 (1993).
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(1)(iv).
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(1)(vi).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(1)(ii).
18 Id.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(1)(i).
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(5)(i).
21 Id.
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(5)(ii).
23 Id.
24 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(g)(3)(ii).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor filed for Chapter 7
in January 1992. In February 1992, the debtor applied for
disaster payments for 1990 and 1991 crop losses under the
federal Disaster Payment Program. In April 1992, the ASCS
paid the debtor $58,000 in disaster payments. The debtor
argued that the disaster payments were post-petition income
not subject to the bankruptcy case. The court held that the
disaster payments were in the form of proceeds for the crops
lost pre-petition; therefore, because the crops would have
been estate property, the disaster payments were the
proceeds of the crops and were estate property. In re Ring,
169 B.R. 73 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption for a residence in which the debtor had $14,000
in equity and which was subject to judicial liens of over
$280,000. The debtor sought to avoid the liens as impairing
the homestead exemption. The Bankruptcy Court had held
that the liens did not impair the exemption because, under
Colorado law, judicial liens do not attach to homestead
property. The District Court reversed, holding that because
the mere existence of the liens could hamper the debtor’s
ownership rights in the property, the liens impaired the
exemption, but the court also held that the liens could be
avoided only to the extent of the debtor’s equity in the
property at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Matter of
Howard, 169 B.R. 71 (D. Colo. 1994).
HOMESTEAD. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption for their motor home in which they resided on
land owned by a brother. The motor home was connected to
utilities and sewage lines and was the debtors’ only
residence. The court examined the Idaho homestead
exemption, Idaho Code § 39-4105(15), and found no
prohibition against claiming a motor home as a homestead
so long as the motor home was the intended residence. The
court noted that the statute had removed case law
requirements that the home be permanently affixed to land
owned by the debtors. The court also noted that the only
difference between motor homes and mobile homes, which
were expressly allowed for the exemption, was that the
motor home had a engine, a difference not covered by the
exemption statute. In re Peters, 169 B.R. 710 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN . A Chapter 12 debtor had made four plan
proposals which were not confirmed. On the fifth attempt,
the court denied confirmation and dismissed the case
because the debtor was unable to propose a confirmable
plan for the following reasons: (1) the plan proposed that
half of the trustee’s fees be paid by the creditors; (2) the
debtor was 60 years old and the plan provided for payments
up to 20 years; (3) the debtor’s farm equipment was very old
and the plan made no provision for equipment repair; (4) the
living expenses were far below the debtor’s historical
expenses; (5) a secured creditor would not receive either the
collateral or payments equal to the secured claim, and (6)
the plan’s haphazard method of paying creditors and
providing income and expense estimates indicated that the
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plan was not proposed in good faith. In re Hoffman, 169
B.R. 608 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
ELIGIBLITY. The IRS had issued a tax deficiency
notice of over $300,000 for additional taxes, fraud penalties,
and substantial underpayment penalties against the debtor
for 1984 and 1985. The debtor filed a petition in the Tax
Court contesting the deficiency notice but before the case
was tried, the debtor filed for Chapter 13. The debtor listed,
however, only a debt for 1984 and 1985 taxes based on a
conviction for tax evasion. The debtor argued that the tax
deficiency claim was nonliquidated because the Tax Court
case was pending. The court held that the issuance of the
deficiency notice was sufficient to make the tax and penalty
claims involved liquidated and included in the debtor’s
debts for purposes of eligibility for Chapter 13. Because the
total  liquidated unsecured debts exceeded $100,000, the
debtor was not eligible for Chapter 13. In re Madison, 168
B.R. 986 (D. Hawaii 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The debtor filed for Chapter 13
and claimed an exemption for an interest in a retirement
plan and a homestead. No objections to the exemptions
were filed by the IRS. The IRS filed a secured claim based
upon a still valid lien. The IRS also did not object to the
debtor’s reorganization plan which provided for partial
payment of the secured claim. The debtor argued that the
lien against the exempt property was extinguished by the
IRS failure to object to the exemptions and the failure to
object to the plan. The court held that federal tax liens are
unaffected by a bankruptcy case and continue after the case
against even exempt property; therefore, the IRS’s failure to
object to the exemptions and plan had no effect on the
validity of the lien. The court also held that, because the IRS
failed to object to the plan, the IRS was bound by the
provision paying only a portion of the tax claim. In re
Babich, 169 B.R. 617 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994), aff’g, 164
B.R. 581 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
CLAIMS. The IRS filed a claim for federal income
taxes owed by the Chapter 12 debtors. The debtors filed an
objection to the claim as “totally unfounded in fact, or law,
and frivolous.” The IRS had made an assessment of the
taxes against the debtors. The debtors supported their
objection with recently filed returns. The Bankruptcy Court
ruled against the debtors and dismissed the case, ruling that
the debtors failed to provide sufficient evidence to disallow
the IRS claim. The District Court held that where the tax
claim was based on unassessed taxes, the IRS had the
ultimate burden of proof on its claim. Therefore, the court
remanded the case for a determination as to whether the
debtors provided sufficient proof to rebut the prima facie
validity of the IRS claim, and if so, to give the IRS the
opportunity to provide evidence proving its claim by a
preponderance of the evidence. In re Brown, 169 B.R. 59
(S.D. Iowa 1994).
The IRS filed a claim for income tax deficiencies for
three of the debtor’s tax years, based upon a reconstruction
of the debtor’s income from bank deposits made by the
debtor in those years. The debtor testified and provided
other evidence showing that many of the deposits were
made with loan proceeds obtained from other banks. The
IRS acknowledged that its calculations were based on
limited records. The court held that the IRS claim was
disallowed because after the debtor provided evidence to
rebut the prima facie validity of the IRS claim, the IRS
failed to sustain its burden of proving the accuracy of its
claim. In re Katz, 169 B.R. 781 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
DEDUCTIONS. The debtor had filed a bankruptcy case
in 1975 and had received a discharge in 1976. The trustee,
however, discovered several pre-bankruptcy transfers by the
debtor of property to a family trust in which the debtor was
not a beneficiary. The trustee sought to recover the assets as
preferential transfers. The debtor filed a state court action to
determine the ownership of the trust assets. The debtor
reached a settlement with the trustee and paid an additional
$35,000 to the bankruptcy estate for distribution to
creditors. The debtor claimed the settlement payment and
the litigation costs as business expenses, arguing that the
expenses resulted from the debtor’s bankruptcy which
involved a reorganization of the debtor’s business. The
Bankruptcy Court and District Court agreed. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the expenses did not arise in
connection with the debtor’s business as a manager of real
estate and a building contractor, but arose from the debtor’s
desire to protect the family trust, in which the debtor had no
beneficial interest and was not part of the debtor’s business
affairs. In re Collins, 26 F.3d 116 (11th Cir. 1994).
DISCHARGE. The debtor was employed as a car
salesman and overstated the number of dependents on the
debtor’s W-4 forms. The debtor held several different
employments over several years and some employers treated
the debtor as an independent contractor and did not withhold
any income taxes. The debtor filed fairly accurate tax
returns for the periods involved and made a good faith effort
to pay the taxes owed. The IRS sought a ruling that the taxes
for years more than three years before the bankruptcy filing
were nondischargeable for willful attempts to evade taxes.
The court held that a pattern of false W-4 forms was not
sufficient indication of willful attempts to evade taxes where
the debtor filed timely and accurate returns and attempted to
pay the taxes.  In re Smith, 169 B.R. 55 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
1994).
TAX LIENS. The IRS filed a claim for $14,000 in
unpaid taxes owed by the debtor and secured by a tax lien
on $4,000 of the debtor’s household goods and pension
plan. The trustee sought to avoid the lien as to all household
goods with a value of less than $250 under 11 U.S.C. §
545(2) and I.R.C. § 6323(b)(1), (4).  The court held that
under Section 545(2), the trustee had the status of a bona
fide purchaser and that the trustee’s deemed acquisition of
the household goods in bankruptcy was a casual sale
qualifying the household goods in the bankruptcy estate as
not subject to the tax lien under I.R.C. § 6323(b)(4).
Therefore, the tax lien was avoidable as to all household
goods valued for less than $250. United States v. Branch,
94-2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,406 (E.D. N.C. 1994).
CONTRACTS
DAMAGES. The plaintiff was a watermelon farmer
who purchased a herbicide from the defendant. The plaintiff
claimed that the herbicide was improperly applied and
140                                                                                                                                                               Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
resulted in the loss of the melon crop. The plaintiff brought
actions in negligence in advising about proper application of
the herbicide and breach of warranty and sought incidental
and consequential damages. The court held that, under
Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 439 Mich. 512, 486
N.W.2d 612 (1992), the plaintiff could not recover in tort for
economic damages caused by a defective product purchased
for commercial purposes. The court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that the negligence occurred only in the advice
about application and not negligence in the product because
almost all of the purchase price was attributable to the cost
of the herbicide.  The court found that the damage was to
the melons and did not occur through an accident nor was
any physical injury alleged. The breach of warranty claim
was also denied because the herbicide label included
disclaimers of all implied warranties. Bailey Farms, Inc. v.
Nor-Am Chemical Co., 27 F.3d 188 (6th Cir. 1994).
MODIFICATION. The defendant was a dairy which
had a contract to purchase milk from the plaintiff. The
contract also included the lease and operation of a
Wisconsin dairy by the defendant and for “equalization”
costs to be added to the “Super Pool” charge for milk
shipped from the Wisconsin dairy to the defendant’s Illinois
plant. In 1989, the defendant informed the plaintiff in
writing that it no longer would pay any additional charges
for milk and would no longer operate the Wisconsin dairy.
The plaintiff responded in writing that new “Super Pool”
prices would be in effect but that any additional production
charges would still be added. The defendant sent a second
letter again refusing to pay more than the “Super Pool”
price. The plaintiff did not respond to the last letter but
continued to ship milk to the defendant’s Illinois plant for
three months. The plaintiff invoiced the defendant for over
$500,000 in additional production costs which the defendant
refused to pay. The defendant argued that the contract price
had been modified by the last letter and plaintiff's conduct in
shipping milk without objection to the last letter. The court
found that although the parties did not come to any written
agreement, the plaintiff's release of the Wisconsin dairy
lease and takeover of operations indicated that the original
contract was being modified. The court held that the
plaintiff’s conduct in shipping milk after the defendant
stated that it would purchase milk only at the “Super Pool”
price was conduct assenting to the defendant’s new price
terms. The court also held that the plaintiff could not rely on
the prior course of conduct between the parties once the
defendant made it clear that a modification was sought.
Associated Milk Producers v. Meadow Gold Dairies, 27
F.3d 268 (7th Cir. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
FARM LOANS. The CCC has issued proposed
regulations amending the debt settlement policies and
procedures to remove references to the Internal Revenue
Service Notice of Levy except to exempt the notices from
coverage. The proposed regulations also amend the interest
rate charged on delinquent loans to the higher of the Prompt
Payment Act rate or the Treasury Department’s current
value of funds rate. The proposed regulations also amend
the ASCS and CCC debt settlement policies and procedures
to provide for offset of a debtor’s pro rata share of payments
due any entity in which the debtor participates. 59 Fed. Reg.
43504 (Aug. 24, 1994).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations amending the Common Crop
Insurance regulations to increase from one to three the
number of years a policy may not earn a premium without
policy termination. The amendment allows a producer to
rotate crops without policy termination. The amendment
also broadens the scope of the application of the rules of the
American Arbitration Association to all disagreements on
factual matters. 59 Fed. Reg. 42751 (Aug. 19, 1994).
MARKETING ORDERS.  In another of a substantial
series of challenges to the California Navel and Valcencia
orange regulations, the plaintiffs were orange handlers
assessed civil forfeiture penalties for violation of the orange
weekly prorated marketing regulation. The plaintiffs
challenged the validity of the regulations as not promulgated
in compliance with the notice and comment requirements of
the Administrative Procedures Act. The court opinion
reviews the lengthy history of challenges to the weekly
regulations and held that the regulations were not
promulgated in compliance with the APA but held that the
plaintiffs were not harmed by the lack of compliance
because the plaintiffs had actual notice of the weekly
meetings and had an opportunity to attend the meetings. The
court also held that once the new regulations were found
invalid, the USDA could not reinstate the prior regulations
without complying with the notice and comment
requirements of the APA. United States v. Sunny Cove
Citrus Ass’n, 854 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04 The plaintiff sought
recovery under the Texas products liability law for injury
suffered from exposure to 2,4-D, a federally registered
pesticide manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff
alleged that the labels on the containers were insufficient
warning. The District Court held that the state court action
for negligent failure to warn was not preempted by FIFRA.
The appellate court reversed, holding that FIFRA preempts
state common law actions involving a registered pesticide
label’s failure to warn.  MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27




MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
taxpayer created a revocable trust funded with stock in a
closely held corporation, with the taxpayer, spouse and third
party as trustees. On the taxpayer’s death, the trustees are to
first pay the taxpayer’s debts, taxes, funeral and medical
expenses and other administrative expenses. The residue of
the trust corpus passed to a marital trust if the spouse
survived the taxpayer. The marital trust provided for
distribution of all income to the surviving spouse and
distribution of principal at the discretion of the trustee. On
the surviving spouse’s death, trust principal is to be used to
pay any estate taxes resulting from inclusion of the marital
trust property in the surviving spouse’s estate, with the
remainder of the trust to pass to charitable foundations. If
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the spouse does not survive the taxpayer, the trust residue
passes to charitable foundations. The IRS ruled that the
residue of the trust passing to the marital trust would be
eligible for the estate tax marital deduction if the estate
makes a QTIP election. The IRS also ruled that the bequests
to the charitable foundations would be eligible for the
charitable deduction either to the taxpayer, if the spouse
predeceases the taxpayer, or to the spouse if the spouse
survives the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul. 9433020, May 19, 1994.
The decedent’s will bequeathed one-third of the estate to
the surviving spouse with the residuary of the estate passing
to the decedent’s children. The will contained a provision
that if the spouse predeceased the decedent, the spouse’s
share passed to the residuary estate. The estate allocated all
of the estate’s debts and expenses to the residuary estate and
none to the marital share. The court held that the bequest
was a general gift and, under state law, was not reduced by
debts and expenses until after the residuary estate was
exhausted. The court also held that Est. of Street v. Comm’r,
974 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1992), did not apply because in
Street, the marital share included the residuary estate and
state law did not provide for allocation of debts and
expenses first to the residuary estate.  Estate of Tessner v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-401.
The decedent and spouse were residents of Texas and
purchased shares in a Massachusetts business trust to be
held as joint tenants. The trust provided that the law of
Massachusetts would apply to the trust. The estate claimed a
marital deduction for the shares as passing under the joint
tenancy rules of Massachusetts. The court held that the law
of Massachusetts applied to the trust to determine the type
of ownership; therefore, the shares were held by the
decedent and spouse as joint tenants and a marital deduction
for the shares was allowed. Estate of Richman v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1994-421.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].*  The
decedent’s estate included 94 acres of unimproved land,
with half of the land in open pasture and half in timberland.
Six years before the decedent’s death, the decedent and son
stopped farming the land and the son started a horse riding
and boarding business on the son’s neighboring land. The
son used a field on the decedent’s land for riding and
training the horses boarded on the son’s land. The riding
field had permanent jumps and other equipment installed.
The son also used pastures on the decedent’s land for the
horses. Three years before the decedent’s death, the
decedent transferred the land to a revocable trust with the
decedent and son as trustees. The trust entered into a
contract with a land development corporation for the
planning and engineering necessary to convert the land to
residential building lots. Once a preliminary plan of
subdivision was approved and sewer authorization granted,
the corporation had a right of first refusal to purchase the
lots. As of the date of the decedent’s death, no plan approval
or sewer authorization was obtained and the contract was
terminated after the decedent’s death. The IRS ruled that the
pasture land owned by the decedent was used in a trade or
business continuously up to the decedent’s death and that
the development contract did not impair the business use of
the pasture land; therefore, the pasture land was eligible for
special use valuation. The IRS refused to rule on the
timberland because of insufficient information. Ltr. Rul.
9433003, April 29, 1994.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[2].* The decedent had established a
revocable trust with the decedent as trustee and sole
beneficiary.  The trust gave the decedent the power to assign
in trust irrevocable fractional shares of the revocable trust
which would be entitled to a share of the trust’s income. The
decedent made six assignments of fractional interests with
values of $10,000 within three years before the decedent’s
death. The decedent’s estate had three personal
representatives and the estate excluded the assigned
irrevocable interest from the gross estate. The IRS
determined that the assigned interests were estate property
and notified one of the personal representatives of an estate
tax deficiency based on an increase in the gross estate. The
estate argued that the notice was deficient because it was not
sent to all personal representatives and that the assigned
interests were not included in the gross estate. The court
held that the deficiency notice was adequate in that the
estate did not designate an official address. Citing McNeely
v. U.S., 16 F.3d 303 (8th Cir. 1994) , the court also held that
the assigned interests were not included in the gross estate
because the decedent had the express power to transfer
irrevocable interests in the trust without terminating the
revocable trust. The court held that although the decedent
did not transfer specific property in the trust corpus, the
assignments of fractional interests accomplished the same
result in that the assignees were entitled to all of the income
from the fractional interests.  Kisling v. Comm’r, 94-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,176 (8th Cir. 1994).
VALUATION. The decedent owned 48.59 percent of
the stock of a corporation in which the decedent’s son
owned the other 51.41 percent. The son inherited the
decedent’s stock and the estate sought a determination as to
whether the son’s ownership of stock in the corporation
affected the value of the decedent’s stock at death for estate
tax purposes.  Citing Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202,
Bright v. U.S., 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981), and Propstra
v. U.S., 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981), the IRS ruled that
the value of the decedent’s stock was not affected by the
legatee’s ownership of the other stock or receipt of the
decedent’s stock. The decedent’s stock was to be valued as
if sold to a willing third party buyer. Ltr. Rul. 9432001,
March 28, 1994.
A corporation’s 1951 shareholders’ agreement provided
for redemption of outstanding shares in the corporation. The
shareholders proposed to amend the agreement again to (1)
increase the repurchase price of shares to 75 percent of the
book value, (2) change the method of payment from 20
equal installments to the greater of 20 equal annual
installments or annual installments of $25,000, (3) limit the
interest rate on unpaid installments to no less than 4 percent
and no more than 12 percent, (4) allow the corporation a
limited power to name an escrow bank, and (5) change the
downpayment required. The IRS ruled that amendments (1)
and (5) provided more than de minimis changes in the value
of the stock but that they offset each other and resulted in a
redemption value more closely approximating fair market
value. The IRS also ruled that amendments (2) and (3)
resulted in only a de minimis change to the quality, value or
timing of the rights of the shareholders. The IRS ruled that
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amendment (4) was only an administrative change.
Therefore, the IRS ruled that the amendments would not
subject the stock to I.R.C. § 2703 on the death of a
shareholder.  Ltr. Rul. 9432017, May 16, 1994.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned stock in a
cooperative apartment building and proprietary leases to a
residence in the cooperative. The taxpayer transferred the
beneficial title to the shares and lease to a trust for 13 years.
The taxpayers retained the legal title because of
requirements set by the cooperative.  The trust provided for
the taxpayers’ use of the residence during the term of the
trust.  On termination of the trust, the taxpayers will enter
into a lease agreement with the remainder holders for the
fair market rent of the property, with the taxpayers paying
all real estate taxes and utility and maintenance costs. The
IRS ruled that the interest in the residence transferred to the
trust was a qualified personal residence sufficient to except
the transfer from valuation under I.R.C. § 2702.  The IRS
also ruled that if the taxpayers die after termination of the
trust, the residence would not be included in their gross
estates, but if the taxpayers die before termination of the
trust, the residence would be included in the taxpayers’
gross estates. Ltr. Rul. 9433016, May 18, 1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS-ALM § 4.03[7].* The taxpayer was a
professional corporation engaged in the practice of law.  In
the course of representing clients, the taxpayer made
payments to third parties for litigation costs ranging from
court fees to photocopying expenses. The taxpayer either
deducted the expenses from the client’s account or billed the
client. The IRS ruled that the expenses were not business
deductions to the extent the taxpayer would seek
reimbursement from the clients; however, once
reimbursement was attempted, if the client failed to pay, the
taxpayer could take a bad debt deduction for the expenses
once the debt became worthless. Ltr. Rul. 9432002, March
30, 1994.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The IRS will provide
expedited consideration for applications for recognition as a
charitable organization for organizations formed to aid
victims of the 1994 floods in the southeast. Such
organizations should write “SOUTHEAST FLOOD
RELIEF” at the top of a completed Form 1023. Notice 94-
87, I.R.B. 1994-34.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* The taxpayers were
professional violinists who purchased 19th century bows for
their violins. The taxpayers claimed depreciation deductions
under ACRS for five-year property. The IRS argued that the
bows were not eligible for depreciation because the bows
did not have a determinable life since the bows would only
appreciate in value as historical art objects. The court held
that the taxpayers were not required to prove a determinable
useful life for the bows because the bows were tangible
property used in a trade or business and were subject to
wear and tear from use during the taxable year.  Simon v.
Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 15 (1994).
The taxpayer purchased a 17th century bass viol for use
in the taxpayer’s profession as a musician. The taxpayer
claimed a depreciation deduction under ACRS. For the same
reasons used in Simon, supra, the court held that the viol
was eligible for the ACRS depreciation deduction.   Liddle
v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 16 (1994).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayers were
a doctor and his wife who owned a small farm on which
they did not reside. The farm was used to raise cattle but had
a profit in only one of 21 years of operation. The taxpayer
generally worked on the farm on weekends and occasionally
on weekdays. The taxpayer made some attempts to reduce
costs and improve the farm’s profitability but did not
increase the acreage or the amount of time spent on the
farm. The court held that the taxpayer did not operate the
farm with the intent to make a profit because (1) the farm
had 20 years of losses; (2) the taxpayer failed to take known
steps (more acreage and more time on the farm) to increase
the profitability of the farm; (3) the taxpayer operated the
farm more for personal pleasure; (4) the taxpayer had
substantial income from other sources against which the
deductions from the farming activity produced substantial
tax benefits; and (5) the taxpayer failed to demonstrate a
reasonable expectation of appreciation of the farm assets.
Hendricks v. Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,413 (4th Cir. 1994), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1993-396.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The taxpayers
owned a greater than 1 percent interest in a general
partnership (the GP). The general partnership owned a 99
percent limited partnership interest in two other partnerships
(the LPs). The IRS audited the LPs and disallowed losses
which resulted in disallowance of the taxpayers’ share of
these losses through their ownership in the GP. The
taxpayer argued that the disallowance of the losses was
invalid as to the taxpayers because the IRS failed to give
them notice of the audits as required by I.R.C. § 6223(a).
The court agreed and ruled that the IRS disallowance of the
LPs’ losses was invalid as to the taxpayers. Raihl v. U.S.,
94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,404 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1994).
The IRS had filed an FPAA with the partnership's TMP,
an S corporation which had filed for bankruptcy. The S
corporation filed a petition for readjustment of the FPAA.
The court held that the petition was invalid because the S
corporation’s interest in the partnership passed to the
bankruptcy estate. Third Dividend/Dardanos Associates v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-412.
ALLOCATION OF PARTNERSHIP ITEMS. Because
of a dispute between two partners, one partner was ordered
to purchase the partnership interest of the taxpayer. Soon
after the buyout order, the partnership sold a building on
installments. The court held that the partnership agreement
could not be used to allocate the gain from the building sale
because the agreement lacked substantial economic effect in
that the agreement did not allocate distributions based on the
partners’ capital accounts, did not require partners to restore
deficit capital accounts, and allowed the taxpayer to first
recover any investment before distributions to other
partners. Thus, the court held that the gain from the property
sale was to be allocated first to restore the taxpayer’s
negative capital account to zero with any remaining gain
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allocated to the partner who acquired the taxpayer’s
partnership interest. The court also held that the purchase of
the taxpayer’s partnership interest occurred after the sale of
the property because the proceeds of the sale were used to
purchase the taxpayer’s interest. Vecchio v. Comm’r, 103
T.C. No. 12 (1994).
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. A general
partnership with all individuals as members converted to a
Limited Liability Company (LLC) with all partners
contributing their partnership interests to the LLC. All of the
members were actively engaged in the business and all had
the power to manage the company. No nonmembers could
participate in LLC management. The state LLC act and the
LLC agreement provided that, upon a terminating event, the
LLC could be continued only with the consent of all of the
remaining members. The LLC act also provided that a
member could transfer an interest in the LLC but that the
transferee of the member’s interest had no right to
participate in the management of the LLC without the
unanimous consent of the other members. The LLC interests
were not subject to registration under state or federal law.
The IRS ruled that the LLC would be taxed as a partnership
because the LLC lacked the corporate characteristics of
continuity of life and free transferability of interests. The
IRS also ruled that a member’s distributive share of LLC
income was self-employment income subject to social
security taxes. The IRS also ruled that the conversion of the
partnership to an LLC did not cause any recognition of gain
or loss and that the LLC could use the cash method of
accounting since the LLC did not have any C corporations
as members, the LLC interests were not registered, the LLC
was not a tax shelter, and all members actively participated
in the management of the LLC business. Ltr. Rul. 9432018,
May 16, 1994.
The taxpayers formed a limited liability company (LLC).
The IRS ruled that the LLC would be taxed as a partnership
because (1) the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of
continuity of life since the state LLC law and the LLC
agreement required the consent of all members to continue
the partnership after a terminating event, and (2) the LLC
lacked the corporate characteristic of transferability of
interests because the Act and agreement provided that if any
member objected to the sale or assignment of a member’s
interest in the LLC, the transferee or assignee had no right
to participate in the management of the LLC. Ltr. Rul.
9433023, May 20, 1994.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in August
1994, the weighted average is 7.23 percent with the
permissible range of 6.51 to 7.95 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 94-86, I.R.B. 1994-35, 51.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
BUILT-IN GAINS. The taxpayer was a medical services
C corporation on the cash method of accounting. On the last
day of the taxable year before the corporation’s Subchapter
S election took effect, the corporation held accounts
receivable which were collected after the corporation
became an S corporation. The court held that the amounts
collected on the accounts receivable were built-in gains.
Frank J. Leou, M.D., P.A. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-
393.
The taxpayer corporation mailed its Form 2553 election
for Subchapter S status with a postmark of December 31,
1986. The IRS requested additional information on
insubstantial matters and then accepted the election
beginning January 1, 1987. The IRS ruled that the
corporation was not subject to the TRA 1986 built-in gains
rule in that the election was not made after December 31,
1986. Ltr. Rul. 9433025, May 20, 1994.
ONE CLASS OF STOCK. An S corporation had one
shareholder owning 65 percent of the common stock and 10
other shareholders owning 35 percent of the stock. The
corporation entered into an agreement to sell its assets to an
unrelated third party.  Under a redemption agreement, the
shareholders had agreed to sell their shares to the
corporation at a price equal to the proportionate share of the
fair market value of the corporation assets attributable to
each shareholder’s stock, less a minority discount. However,
the redemption price could not be less than the book value
of the stock on the date of the redemption agreement. The
IRS ruled that the redemption agreement did not create a
second class of stock because the agreement met the
requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(2)(iii)(A) that (1)
the agreement was not entered into to circumvent the second
class of stock provision and (2) the agreement set a stock
value of at least book value and not more than fair market
value. Ltr. Rul. 9433024, May 20, 1994.
LABOR
REPRESENTATION ELECTION. The plaintiff
operated a vineyard and the United Farm Workers (UFW)
union filed a petition for an election as the representative of
the plaintiff’s agricultural workers. The election petition
alleged that the plaintiff’s agricultural work force was
greater than 50 percent of the peak agricultural employment
for the year. The ALRB requested current and expected
agricultural employment figures from the plaintiff which
supplied inconsistent figures from at least 136 to 150 current
workers and an expected peak of 250 workers. The election
was certified and 150 workers voted, with a majority
approving UFW representation. The plaintiff filed an
objection to the election, claiming that because additional
acres were recently acquired, the expected peak
employment would be 358 workers; therefore, the election
was not held when employment was at least 50 percent of
the peak employment. The ALRB denied the objection
without a hearing and the plaintiff appealed the denial
without a hearing. The court held that the plaintiff failed to
present any evidence that rebutted the ALRB’s prima facie
case that it had substantial evidence to support the original
determination that the election date employment exceeded
50 percent of the peak employment. The court noted that the
ALRB’s decision was based on figures supplied by the
plaintiff and verified by the election participation. Scheid






PERFECTION-ALM § 13.01.* The debtor was a
cotton merchant which entered into an agreement with
another cotton merchant in which the cotton merchant
agreed to repurchase certificated cotton from the debtor.
The cotton remained in the possession of the debtor but the
merchant took possession of the warehouse receipts as
collateral for funds expended to repurchase the cotton. Both
parties were to attempt to sell the cotton, with the proceeds
used to repay the loan. After the cotton was repurchased,
the debtor wanted to decertify the cotton and recertify the
cotton in order to remove overage charges. The merchant
agreed to release the warehouse receipts to a subdepository
company connected to another creditor of the debtor. The
subdepository issued farmer trust receipts for the warehouse
receipts and blocked the warehouse receipts on its books.
The court held that the subdepository was a bailee for the
cotton merchant and that the merchant’s security interest in
the warehouse receipts, established when the merchant
originally took possession of them, was retained when the
subdepository, as bailee, took possession of the receipts and
issued a farmer trust receipts for the warehouse receipts and
blocked off the warehouse receipts on its books. In re
Julien Co., 168 B.R. 647 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
In re Fischer, 169 B.R. 43 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994)
(constructive dividends) see p. 117 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
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